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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CLINTON C. THOMPSON,
vs.

Plaintiff,.

Case No.

AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY,
Defendant.

10775

BRIEF O,F APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This iB an aetion by Plaintiff, as insured under a
group accident insurance policy, to recover benefits provided in the policy for permanent and total disability.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
On hearing before the District Court the Court
granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment and
Plaintiff appeals.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
rl'he case is before this Court on appeal. Plaintiff
'l'Plrn n'versal of the judgment of the Districi Court for
1

an order dirPeting judg1ll(•nt in favor of Plaintiff, or
failing that an order remanding thP case to the District
Court for trial.
STATEMEN11 OF FACTS

In .July, 196-1, Plaintiff was an employec of t1w StatP
of Utah and was insured undp1· a group accident insurance policy carried by the State of L;tah -1\'ith Defendant
American Casualty Comriany.
days prior to .July 19, 19G-1, Plaintiff had heen
engaged in certain strennous physical exertion in unnsual
circumstances.
T\YO

On t}w evening of .July 19, 19G-1, Plaintiff experiencerl
severe seizures which started in his )pft arm and side
and sprPad to his ·wholP body becoming full grand ma\
seizures. He was rushed to a local hospital wlwre the
seizures continued for a period of approximakly 2-J.
hours. As a result, Plainbff was rc•nderpd totally disabled from performing any type of physical labor. m
was sixty years of age at the tim('..
At the time nf the alll'ged aceident, Plaintiff was
troubled with two or three underlying physical ailments.
In 19-10 Plaintiff had been thrnwn from a horse and
suffered a lwad injury ·which ('ansC'd occasional hlackouts. Brain rmrgery was ptTfonrwd sonw two yc•ars lnfrc·
for removal of a large blood elnt and Plaintiff fnll\
recovered excPpt for a slight impairment in his left forearm and hand, a result of some minor d_amagp to th<' right
2

side of tlw brain. For OV('l' twenty years Plaintiff lived
and worlu-d nonnally without any unusual physical disal1ility and without experiencing any blackouts or seiz1ues. Plaintiff also hacl some degree of arteriosclerosis
(liankning o.f the arteries) and pulmonary ernphysemia
(a lung ailnH'nt).
For about five years prior to July, 1964, Plaintiff
had 1rnrked in Salt Lake City as a night watchman and
custodian, and more recently as a maintenance man.
1le connn<'nced work for the State in January, 1960.
Srveral years prior thereto he had been a farmer in
wntlH:•rn Utah. His duties during the past few years
as nistodinn and maintenance man included cleaning
floors and windows, dusting desks, miscellaneous carpentr~· and plumbing wo.rk, moving furniture and changing
lights.
On .July 17, 196-t-, just two days prior to the seizure
attaek dt>scribed above, and for a few days prior thereto,
Plaintiff had been engaged in strenuous physical exertion
undt>r unusual conditions. He had performed an entirely
lliffc·rent type of work than that to which he was accustonwd, to-wit: using a 35-40 pound jackhammer-type
l"leetric drill to drill an opening through a concrete wall.
'l'J1e work area was confined, a basement tunnel, and
tenqwratnres were high. During part of the time, Plaintiff was assisted by another employee, but for most of
the time he worked alone.

1

Plaintiff stated that he had never performed work
a:-; stn~nuous and under such conditions. He perspired
\Pl'Y lteavilv and became completely physically exl1a 11 st <'d.

3

Both Dr. Kenneth .J. Nielson, Plaintiff's physician,
who treated him while in the hosiptal, and a specialist,
Dr. E. Daniel Nusbaum, a neurologist, ·who examined
Plaintiff, stated that while Plaintiff had pre-existing
physical ailments or diseses, it ·was this strenuous physical exertion which precipitated the seizures resulting in
the total disability.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFF'S TOT AL DISABILITY WAS CAUSED BY
AN ACCIDENT WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE TERMS
OF THE INSURANCE POLICY.

The Complaint sets forth the insuring terms of
the policy alleging:

.

". . . Plaintiff sustained hodily injuries
through accidental means which directly and independently of all otlwr causes, caused plaintiff to
become permanently and totally disabled." (R-1)
The District Court erred in holding in its summary
judgment that this total disability sustained by Plaintiff
was not caused by an accident:
" . . . insuranee policies shonld be construed
liberally in favor of tlw insured and their beneficiaries so as to promote and not defeat the
purpose of insurance." (Richards v. Standard
Acc1'dent Ins. Co., (UtahL 200 P. 1017)
"Accident assurance companies do business
mostly with the common people, and the term
'accident,' as used in these policies, should be construed most strongly against the companies, and
be defined according to the ordinary and usual
understanding of its signifieation." (Moutzo11ko,'
4

!

v. Mufoal Ben., Health & Accident Ass'n. (Utah),
25± P. 1005)

AR has been set forth above, a short time prior
to the seizures, Plaintiff, a 60-year-old man weighing
approximately ] 50 ponnds, had engaged in unusual and
Rtrenuous physiral exertion. He had used a jackhammer
to drill through a concrete wall (not the floor), which
rPqnired that the hammer he held and pushed against the
'rnll. Temperatures were high and the working area
was confined.
Plaintiff's deposition, taken by Defendant's counsel,
reveals certain significant facts. Plantiff stated that
hiR custodial and maintenance duties which he regularly
]lf'l'forrned for several years prior to the injury had
1wt been physically hard. (Pages 6 and 7 - Thompson
deposition) -When asked about the tunnel drilling, he
~tated that he had never done that type of work before
and that he had never done anything as strenuous nor
under such conditions. (Pages 13 and 33 - Thompson
dr>position) He stated that at the end of the day he was
eompletely exhausted and his clothes were saturated with
S\n~at; that it was necessary when he got home to get
into a tuh of water to revive his strength. (Page 32 Thompson deposition) He emphasized throughout his
testimony that he had never done work so exhausting
under snch circumstances; that even the farm work had
not heen so bad, and it had been performed in the open.
Plaintiff, at the time of the injury, was several years
ol(lcr than when he ·worked the farm. (Page 33 - Thomp'on dPposition)
5

It is noteworthy that both physi(·ians W<'l'<~ irnpn•ssr·rl
that the strPnuous ph:n;ieal activit~, was tlw pre<·ipitating
c·ause of tlw injuri('S. Dr. :t\usbamn said, " ... hut with
the status <'piJqitirns VPry lil\:t•Jy rm•cipitated h~' fatig111•
and fluid loss, and elc.trolyte irnhalanrP associat<><l with
the performance of heavy labor in a ronfined s1iacr·."
Dr. NiPlson said, "rl1lw seizure was preeipitatPd b~- stn•nuous activity."
A Ftah Supreme Court dPcision with reuiarkahlP
similarities to this case is Richards v. Standard Accidrid
Ins. Co., supra. There the insurPcl \\'as eovered h~' an
accident insurance policy whirh eontairn•d provision>
substantially like' the pres<mt policy. It insm·pd again1't
" ... loss resulting from hoclily injnriPs ('fft>cted directly
Pxclusively and inclepC'ncl<_•ntly of all otlwr causes,
through accidental nwans, ... " Tlw in;;;nr<'d, while walking through a desert area from a mining site, <lied of
snnstrokP. rrlw Court consiJ<_•red at l(•nµ;th tlw consi(lerable evidenee that sunstroke was a dist>asP hnt eonclndt'<l.
" ... it is el<>arly manifest that sunstroke is covered by
the words 'bodily injuriPs hy accidental mPans.' " The '
Court affirmed the Trial Court holding for tli<> bem·ficiary, concluding:
''Our conclusions are tl1at thP term 'hoclily
injnries' ·within tlw rnc•c.111i11g- of tlw 1iolicy L'll1hra('t'S sunstrok<> or a lwat strokP from the dirPct
raYs of the sun; that tlw sunstroke• was it;-;l·ll
in 'this ('ase an aeeicl<•ntal cause or means n•snlti11.~ ,
in tlw d<•ath of tlH' insnrP<l; that th<' co1ubinatio 11
of nn<'x1wctPcl circumstarn·<•s, and particularly t]ll'
miscalculation of the distance from the river to
t!H• mining elairn, \Y<'l'<' aeei<l<>ntal rn\'ans nnr'-:1 11 ·(·!

6

ed1y proclueing an unforeseen and unforeseeable,
nnusua1, and not to be expected result, and that
on the admitted facts, the submittal of the issues
to the jury was unnecessary; plaintiff being entitled to an instruction din•cting a verdict in her
favor .... "
'rhe Richards case was like the case at bar, particularl>' with regard to the nature of the "accident.'' Here
the insured engaged in strenuous physical labor in a
confined, hot space. There the insured walked for several
hours in the sun through desert heat. In both cases the
"arcid(•nt," or precipitaing event, was not instantaneous
hut continued over a period of time before it took its
toll on the~ individuals. In the Richards case, it was the
lwat and pffort over a period of several hours. In this
case, it was the strenuous work in a hot, confined area
ow•r a fe\v days.
In th<:~ deposition, Defendant's counsel pointedly
asked Plaintiff if he did not expect to be tired and exhaustPd \\'hen performing such work. Plaintiff said that
a num c•xriects to be fatigued to a certain degree, but
that he did not Pxpect to be as exhausted as he was.
(Pages 13 and 14 - Thompson depo•sition) The same
question arose in the Richards case coneerning the intentional or Yoluntary nature of the insured's conduct
or act. The Court ans\Yered:
"Possibly grt>att>r care might have been exercis(•tl hy Richards and his companions. Possibly
all ·were nt>gligent in not taking more water and
in 11ot adopting some additional precautionary
nwasures. But negligence is not here involved.
Fnder this policy it is not a defense which the
appellant may invoke.

7

H 'T

i~

• 'vo
. l untary exposnn' to danger' a
e1• tl wr 1s

defense. The policy does not contain su('h a provision.
"rnless the deceased int0ndPd to produce the
ven· result which occurred, the element of danger
is both unimportant and immaterial, because, a8
said in Interstate Business l\f en's Acc. Ass'n. v.
Lester, supra:
'Persons protected by accident insurance
may incnr consciously hazards which may
result in their injury or death without fo~
feiting the insurance, unless the policy expressly excepts the hazards.' ''
Certainly Plaintiff did not forese>e or anticipate the
severe seizures or the resulting effeds - the total disabl<'ment.
Texts and cases indicate that there is some division
of authority with respect to whether the insuring clauses
of standard accident policies cover harm which result~
from or is caused hy strenuous t'xertion or Pxercise. See
Couch on Insurance, Second Edition, Sections -U :13q
and 41 :139. Utah and a large numher of jurisdiction~
allo\\' recovery under policies for harm resulting from
unusual exertion and similar acts. See the follO\ving:
Rupture of blood vessel whil<:' cranking an automobile,
Homr>, Benefit Assn. 'l". Smith (Tex.), 16 S\V 2d 357; choking while attempting to S\Yallow a pi<·ee of beefsteak, American Accide11t Co. v. Beigart, 9+ Ky. 5-1:7, 2:) SW 191:
hernia cansed by lifting in the coursP of insured 's duties,
Rauert v. Doyal Protcctire I11s. C'o., Gl Ida. G77, lO!i P.
2d 1015; heart rupture of a man aern:..;torn<>d to lifting.
caused by lifting an unusually hl'nxy \Yeight, Cullu1111' 1·.

8

Aetna Life Ins. Co., (Conn.) 199 A. 103; rupture of heart
or heart vessPl by voluntarily lifting in the course of
one's husin0ss, Plrdger v. Business M. Accident Asso.
('I'C'x.), 228 S\V 110.
Utah has dearly adopted a liberal rule in construing
aeC'id<'llt policies. In the M outzmtkos case, supra, the
poli('~· in qtwstio.n insured against "loss of limb, sight,
or time, resulting directly and independently of all other
eanses, from bodily injuries sustained through purely
areidental means." The provision is almost identical
to the poliey in this case. There the Plaintiff, while
lifting a heaYy mining timber in the course of his employmmt, sustained a rupture which necessitated an operation and confinement in the hospital. The insurance
company contended that where a man simply injures
himself in the regular course of his work by voluntarily
lifting, especiall~v where he is lifting a timber of the
~mme character that he is handling one after the other
witliout any unforeseen happening to cause the injury,
it doPs not come "'ithin the terms of the policy.
1.'he Court ronclnded that the insured's act causing
the hernia was, in fact, an accident. The Court quoted
and approved the following statement from a Missouri
ease:
'''Any unusual and unexpected event attending tlw performance of a usual and necessary act,'
whether the aet be performed by the party injured
or by another, is ordinarily and usually under:stood to he an event which happened by accident.
In the fore going cases it seems to us a too strict
and illiberal definition of the term was adhered
to. At any rate, they are not reconcilable with
9

tlw gent>ral trend of the hest consid('red American
cases, ·which hold that accidPntal means are those
'·'Thich produce effeets which are not the natnral
and probable consequence of the act. 'An effect
which is not the natural or probable consequence
of the means which produced it, an effect which
does not ordinarily follow and cannot be reasonahl~' anticipated from the use of such means, an
effe<:>t which the actor did not intend to produce
and which he cannot be charged with the design of
producing, is produced by accidental means.'"
See also to the same effect approving the foregoing
rules and eases, Carter ·v. Standar.d Accidr11t Co., 65
Utah 465, 238 P. 259.
In the case of Handley v. llfotiwl Life Ins. Co. of
New York, (Utah) 147 P. 2d 319, the insuring provisions
of the policy were substantially identical to this case,
although the circumstances of the accident were different.
The Court discussed at some length the definition of
"accidental" o·r "accident." Referring to the Richards
case, the Court said, commenting· on Plaintiff's long
walk in the sun :
"Having determined that sunstroke \\'as an
injury it chose also. to rest the decision on the
ground that even though the <.~xtra journey was
not accidental but intended the rcs11lt was unexpected, unanticipated, and therefore accidental." (P. 322)
And further on the Court says:
" . . . there is, as has been herdofore .i~ti
mated, substantial authority for the proposition
that whether the means are accidental is deter-
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mined hy th,, charader of their effects. '.Accidental rneans nrr those which produce effects which
are uot their natural and probable consequences.'"
(Emphasis added)
And the Court concludes:
" ... where it clearly appears from the evidence that the operation set in motion definite
particles of matter distinctly and directly traceable to the operation without which the probability is that they would not have been generated
or st't in motion and it specifically appears that
the action o.f that substance on a vital organ
caused the death of the patient, such death was
directly caused by an injury effected by violent,
external and accidental means."
Ree also JJJ etropolitan Life Ins. Co. vs. Funderburk
(T\·xas Civil Avpeals), 81 SvV 2d 132, where it was held
that the policy provisions covered the insured where
insured suffered heat stroke while working in an oil
tank ear where he had gone voluntarily to work with a
1 iwting hammer and caulking tool, in the absence of
any circumstances shmving that the insured should have
anticipated heat exhaustion, or that he voluntarily assumed the risk of a heatstroke.
It is submitted that the District Court erred in holding- that the total disability sustained by Plaintiff was
not <'aused bv an accident. The Utah cases, supported by
other sound authorities, clearly hold that unusual and
>trt>nuons exertion, such as that experienced by Plaintiff, is an "accident" within the terms of the policy.

11

POINT II
WITHIN THE COVERAGE OF THE POLICY, PLAINTIFF'S INJURY WAS SUSTAINED DIRECTLY AND INDEPENDENTLY OF ALL OTHER CAUSES.

Tlw Distriet Court e1Ted in its summary jndt,'TIWnt
in holding that if an accident oceurred Plaintiff was at
the tinw sufforng from two disease or infirmities, which
cooperated with the accident, resulting in the disability.
CJ1he District Court failed to specify what those two diseases or infirmities were.)
As heretofore set forth, the insnranee poliey which
coven•d Plaintiff contained standard accident insuring
language insuring against bodily injuries sustained
through accidental means "dirp,ctly and independently of
all other cmtses."
It is conct>ded that Plaintiff had certain underlying
infirmities or ailments but taking the testimony and
statements of the two doctors as a whole, they point to
the conclusion that the precipitating cause of the injury
was tht> strenuous physical exertion.
The general rule followed in lTtah, as set forth in
the cases following, holds that benefits are recoverable
under an accident insurance policy, even thongh the insured had an existing physical ailment or disability which
may have contributed to the death or injury.
It will he important at this point to consider the
medical eYidenee. Dr. Nusbaum, tlw neurological spe·
eialist, examinPd Plaintiff. His lettf'r dated J annary 21.
19G5 addressed to Continental~ ational American (]ron]l

'
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Insurance, contains a detailed report and evaluation of
his examination. It concludes with the following:
''He has a seizure disorder which resulted in
tlie status epilepticus, probably a focal cortical
onsf•t in the right hemisphere, secondary to a re~
mote brain and head injury, but with the status
0pilepticus very likely prPcipitated by fatigue and
fluid loss, and electrolyte imbalance associated
with the performance of heavy labor in a confined
svacP." (R-28) (Emphasis added.)
Dr. Nusbaum mentioned the pulmonary problem
(lnng ailment) in his letter but does no.t speak of it as
a significant factor.

In a letter dated September 26, 1964, attached to his
deposition, Dr. Nielson, Plaintiff's attending physician,
stated that in his opinion the seizures were the result of
the prior brain damage, "precipitated by strenuous activity.''
rl1he following excerpts are quoted from Dr. Nielrnn't-< deposition taken by Defendant's counsel:

"Q: Now with reference to the last paragraph which I have ;just read it is your opinion
that at thE' time of the alleged accident Mr.
rrhompson is eomplaining of there was an existing
disPase or injury which contributed or which cooperating with the accident resulted in his disability?
''A: Yes, there was the underlying disease
and something precipitated it obviously."
(Nielson deposition - pages 16 and 17)
"Q: Is it your opinion l\Ir. Thompson's
brain was in a damaged condition, that he was

13

::mff Pring from a pulmonary disPai'w, and that tlw
alleged ac>cident aggravated his previous brain
damage or brain infirmity causing the resulting
stroke and seizures?
·
''A: Yes."
(Nielson deposition - pagt> 17)

"Q : ... do I understand that even assrnning these underlying problems, he had the emphysemia and the prior brain damage, that there
had to he a precipitating cause that caused thr
seizure activity?
"A: 1llfe don't alwa~'s understand ·why a person has a seizure at a particular time. \;Ve just
aren't intelligent Pnough but there usually is, although 'Ne can't always say what caused the seizure activity, there usually is.
"Q : A precipitating ca use~
"A: Yes. We do know certain things. We
do know the relative anoxia or lack of oxygen,
electro.Iyte disturbance, ±1uid retention are all factors which bring- on seizures, precipitate seizures,
I should say.
"Q : Can these be caused by such things
strenuous labor?
"A: Yes.

a~

"Q : Strenuous exercise~
"A: Related in one sense to a heart aittack,
strpnuons Pxercise causes a relative lack of oxygen to the heart and in a similar way it can causf'
relative lack of oxygrn to a damaged brain and
electrolyte impairmrnt dPfinitely precipitate~
seizures.
(Nielson deposition - pages 19 and 20)
"'Q: LPt me ask you this liypothrtically,
Dodor: If a man has g01w on for SPVl ral ~·ear~
1

14

\\'ithont S<':Wre activity and he does a certain
typC' of work, rertain level of physical activity in
his work and lw snddenly for a day or a few days
engaged in 'Nork that is nnusually heavy, that is
it is mnrh heavier than the work he is normally
engaged in, where he perspires much more heavily
than he normally ·would, what would you say about
that as a precipitating canse of seizure activity?

* * * * * * *
"A: Yes, definitely it conld be a precipitating cause. I have no evidence whatsoever. That
is beyond my capacity to know how much exercise he did exert or was engaged in.
"Q: But assuming?
"A: Assuming that he did engage in an

incrC'ased amount of physical exercise certainly
could have precipitated it."
(Nielson deposition - page 20)
[n his de1)osition, Dr. Nielson also mentions chronic
bronchitis but sa:n; that it was not a contributing cause.
(PagP 1:2 - Nielson deposition) He also stated that
obstructive pulmonary emphyst>mia could have been a
<·ontributing cause, but with the Plt>ctrolyte abnormality.
The doctor goes on to note that the electrolyte problem
dl•wlops as a result of fluid loss when one has been
\\·orking "bt>yond his usual capacity and with increased
perspiration you lose a certain amount of sodium and
llotassiurn . . . the patient is mo.re susceptable to seizures." (Pagl'S 12 and 13 - Nielson deposition) Dr.
Xidson also found that Plaintiff was suffering from
arkriosclerosis (hardening of the arteries.).
11'

The rule outlined in one of the leading texts is that
an accident sds in motion agencies which result in

15

disability or dc>ath, such accidPnt is r<'garded as the i'iolP,
direct, and proximate cause of death, PVPn though thP
injured person was sufforing from infirmity or disease.
The total ultimate harm sustained is still regarded as
caused by tht> accident, although the harm would not
have lwen so st•vere had it not been for the pre-existing
disease. An injury which causc>s tlw death of a person
in impaired health or suffering from disease is the cause
of his death, even though he would not have died if his
health had not been impaired. Furthermore, recovery
may be had under a policy providing for payment where
"death is caused by external, violent and acridental
means, independently of all otlwr causes, and excluding
payn1ent wlwre death is caused fully from disease" if
the accident is the proximate cause and sets in motion
a chain of events leading directly to death, and notwithstanding that a pre-existing disease contributed to death.
Couch on Insurance, Second Edition, Volmne 10, SPction
41 :85.
There are two Utah decisions which bear significantly on this issue. They hold that although the insurrd
under an accident insurance policy was afflicted with a
disease or ailment which contributed to the death or disability, that still such death or disability was the result
of an "accident" within the terms of the policy.
In Lcr, v. New York Life Ins. Co. (1938), 95 Utah
445, 82 P.2d 178, Plaintiff sued to rt'cover double indemnity benefits for the death of lwr hnshand. The insuring
ter;ns of the policy were substantinll:-.' identical to th 1•
policy in the ease at bar, containing the phrase "din•dly

1G

and independrmtl~r of all other causes.'' The insured,
\\ Jiilc maneuvering a trailer, was pushed against the side
of a building and the trailer tongue hit him in the right
:-;ide of the abdomen. He subsequently became ill and
\ms confined to bed. Later he was up and about but
tlw illness continued and he Yrns again confined to bed.
Ahout a month later, he was operated on for appendit·itus and during the operation his gall bladder was removed. Shortly thereafter, he died. It was discovered
during the operation that the insured had been suffering
from a diseased and infected gall bladder, whi0h infected
condition had existed prior to the date of the blow to
the stomach. The Court noted, giving Plaintiff's evidence full credence, that the diseased and infected gall
bladder had been rupture by the blow, causing the infection to spread and infect the appendix, making the operation necessary, which eventually caused death. The
Court held that with "this chain of causation" the accidPnt causing the injury, causing diffusion of the infection, c-ansing the appendicitus, and causing death, and
for the purposes of the policy the accident and not the
pre-Pxisting diseased condition of the gall bladder was
the sole cause of death. The Court stated:
" ... where an accidental injury sets in motion
or starts activitv of a latent or dormant disease
and such disPas·e co11tributPs to the death after
having been so precipitated by the aecident, the
disease is not a direct or indirect cause of death,
nor a contributing cause within the meaning of
the terms of the policy, hut the accident which
started tlw mischief and precipitated the condition resulting in death is the sole cause of death."
(Emphasis added)
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In this case, Plaintiff had a "r(•tttoh• hrnin an<l lwad
injm·y." He had (•x:pni<·nc·(•d no lllacl~outs, s<'izures or
otlwrwise, for ovPr twenty y<'ans, hut wlwn the hravy
exertion li1·ecipitatr•d thP ~wizur<'s the)' 1wgan in the Mt
sidP of his hod:' tlwn'h:' indicating a relationship to thl'
old head injury.

In TVhitc c. National Postal Transport Ass'n. (1953), '

l l Ttah 2d 5, 2Gl P.2d 92~-, a ·widow sued to recover under
thP provisions of an accidental death benefit policy for
the death of her husband. Thr policy provisions werP
even more limiting than in the present case. "Accidental death shall he construed to he either sudden, violent
death from t>xternal, violent and accid0ntal nwam; l'f'sulting directly, ind0pend<~ntly and exclusively of all
other causes; . . . tlH'n' shall he no liability whatever
when disease, defect, or bodily infirmity is a contributing cause of death." The insured had been afflictrd with
rlwmnatic fever in his childhood, whieh left him ·with a
mechanically damag<•d heart. Tlw doctor who treated ,
the insured described his condition as "congestive heart
failure or a heart \d1ich is no longer able to handle it~
load." This condition was also described as "advanced
hPart disease and serious cardiac dis<>ase.'' He had
what is known as Buerger's dist•as0. An ineident of tltl'
insured·s h0art condition, when adive, was anriC'nlar
fihrillaLon, or the throwing out by the heart of emlwli
or frag1m•nts of bloo<l dots pm111iPJ out into the hod:
1
that could blocl' circulation in a11 Px:tn•mity or in a yita
organ of the body. 'l'lH· insured wa;;; st rnC'k on tlH' cnlf
of his right 1c•g h:· th<' c.onwr of a \1·oo<kn lwnC'lt ,,Jiirli
was being 1110ve(l. A hruis<' d<•V(•lopPd \1-l1i('h lwc·nnw wr'

1

1
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11ainful, and after a short time he \Vas confined to the
hospital. The leg grew progressively worse. An operation
was performed to remove the blood clot, but the leg did
rn1t im]ffOVe and gangrene set in. Several weeks later
tlw leg was amputated. About three and a half months
later 1\·hile in the hospital, the insured died and the
docto1· who examined him imnwdiately after death fixed
the immediate cause of death as cerebral artery embolism. rrhe Defendant insurance company refused to pay
benPfits on the ground that the accidental bump on the
l<'g was not directly, independently and ex!Clusively the
r·ause of death but that the heart disease and Buerger's
disease were at least contributing causes. At trial, the
Plaintiff proceeded on alternate theories that the acciclPntal hlo\Y to the leg rpactivated or lighted up an inadi v<~ heart condition which led to the death, or that
the blow :startPd an unbroken chain of circumstances
11 hieh lt•d to tlte death, independently of any contributing
l'au:s<~. All rnediral testimony at the trial agreed that in
thPir best judgment the Plaintiff died from the enlarging
ul' an (•mholns in the brain (cerebral embolism). The
Co mt eonel nded, referring to the Lee case, supra:
'''l'his Comt hdd that the Trial Court did not
<>lT in snbmitting the case to the jury because
th<:>n' \\as evidence that the blow had activated a
donuant condition which contributed to the death
aft<'r having bPen so precipitated by the accident.
\V v conclndPd that if the ;jury believed that evicl<•nce, the diseas<' was not a direct or indirect
<'.allS<~ of death nor a contribuing cause within the
llH'aning of the terms of the policy, but the acci<knt wh;eJ1 started the mischief and precipitated
1It<' eondition resulting in death was the sole cause
of dPath."
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"YiPwing tlw PvidPnC<' ns a wl10h' and in tlw
light most favorable to th~3 respondent, \Ve find
no error in suhrnitting the case to the jury under
instructions Pmbod)·ing tlw respondent's two
theories as to the cause of death.''
See also an Idaho eas<:>, Rm1rrt u. Loyal Protectit r
Ins. Co., s11vru, where the insured who died from an in- ,
ternal hernia had suffored, several years previous, a
hernia or rupture which resulted in adhesions which
formed a fibrous ring on the abdominal wall which contributed to the injury and death.
1

1

lfore Plaintiff was a 60-year-o.id man who many
years previous had suffered a head injury which had required brain surgery and left him with minor brain damage described by Dr. Nusbaum as "remote." For twenty
years, Plaintiff lived and worked normally; he experienced no blackouts and no seizures. On July 19, 1964,
two days after having engaged in unusual strenuous
physical exertion, he suffered severe and prolonged
seizures whieh resulted in total disability. rrhe medical
experts who examined Plaintiff stated that the work lw
had performed was extraordinarily hard and strenuous
and pointed to this physical exertion as the precipitating
cause of the seizures.
POINT III
THERE ARE ISSUES OF FACT WHICH SHOULD BE
SUB1\1ITTED TO THE TRIAL COURT FOR DETERl\IINATION.

Plaintiff has set forth above his reasons and arguments why the ruling of the District Court should he
20
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n'V('l'S<'d and why summary judgment should be rendered
in his favor. As an alternate argument, Plaintiff submits that there are basic and material issues of fact which
should he submitted to the District Court for determination by the trier of fact.
The two hasic issues m this case are (1) whether
Plaintiff's injmy arose out of an accident, and (2)
1rhcther the accident caused the injury independent of
other causes. The essential facts in the case have been
stated above and ,,rill not be reiterated here. Plaintiff
lias attempted to show, based on the established facts,
that under the decisions of this Court interpreting standard aecident insurance policies, there was an accident
and that such accident caused the injury. In the first
place, the unusual physical exertion Plaintiff underwent was clearly an accident within the meaning of
the policy as defined by Utah cases and the better authorities of this country. Secondly, the medical experts,
hoth the doetors who examined Plaintiff, point clearly
tu this physical exertion under the conditions in which
it was performed as the precipitating cause of the seiznres. Certainly, if Plaintiff is not entitled to summary
jndgnwnt, he is entitled to have these issues presented
to the Trial Court.
"Whether the death of the insured who was
suffering from disease was caused solely by an
aeic·i<lent or was contributed to directly or indirectl>T by the disease are questions of fact for determination hy the jury. Likewise, if the insured was
snfft'ring from a hodily infirmity, ~b:iay have
lwen suffering from such an infirmity, at the time
of the aceident, the question whether the insured

21

died as a l'<'Slllt Of lJoclily injnrit•s, directl,\' and
i11de1wnclentl,\· of all oth<>r carnws, nnd so!e]y
through ('xtc•rnal. viol<>nt, and aceidental nwan~
is a qut>stion for the j1H)' to ddennin<>." ( Coucl;
on TnsurancP, Yol. 10, See. -l-1 :91)
80<> also tli<' lVliite eas(•, s11pra, and the language

quoted from that deci::-;ion ·w]H·n·in this Court held that
the Trial Court did not en in suhrnitting the case to
tlw jury when' then' ·was evide>nce that the accident had
activated a dormant condition ·which contrihuted to the
death after having been precipitated by the accident.
CONCLlTSION
Con::-;idering the t>vidence hefore the Conrt which
descrihed the nature> of tlH:.' aeridPnt, tlw extent of injury
and tlw resulting total disahilit)·, and in the light of the
interpretive decisions of this Court and of the better
authorities, it is respectfully submitted that Plaintiff did
suffer an accident and that such accidt>nt 'ms the cause
of Plaintiff's total disability. rrhe judgment of the Trial
Conrt should he reverst>d and judgnwnt he entered in
favor of tlw Plaintiff. In the altf•rnatiw, this matter
should be> remanded to the District Court for trial.
Resp<:.>ctfnlly suhmittPd,
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